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Transboundary Dispute Resolution
as a Process and Access to
Justice for Private Litigants:
Commentaries on Cesare Romano's
THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
DISPUTES: A PRAGMATIC
APPROACH (2000)
Henry W. McGee, Jr.1 and Timothy W. Woolsey2
I.
NEGOTIATION AND THE TREATY PROCESS IN THE
RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES
Cesare R. P. Romano, of the New York University Center for
Global Cooperation, argues for and advocates arbitrative
processes as the most tenable means of solving transboundary
conflicts over the impacts of environmental pollution as well as
access to natural resources. Against the backdrop of the thus far
immortal principle of sovereignty, Romano eschews traditional
explanations of the process by which nations settle these disputes
in this important, comprehensive, and very readable book that
surveys and reviews the classic conflicts of international environ-
mental law.
Romano introduces his authoritative and comprehensive work
with an analysis of the existing treaty framework in which the
1. Professor of Law, Seattle University; Professor Emeritus, UCLA School of
Law.
2. J.D., expected, 2002, Seattle University School of Law; B.A., 1998, American
University. The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance in the preparation of
this essay by Heather M. Morado, J.D., expected, 2003, Seattle University School of
Law.
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conflicts have had to be resolved. He suggests that the present
regime is not productive as the literature (and our hopes) might
suggest, especially if the outcome is an analogue of national legal
systems in which someone is found eventually at fault, and com-
pensation is the natural right of the victorious litigant. Instead,
he views arbitration and non-compliance procedures as more ef-
fective means of resolving transboundary international environ-
mental disputes. Romano accepts the reality of sovereignty as a
construct and entrenched obstacle that frustrates the search for a
just resolution of environmental wrongs when redress is sought
from nation states. He does, however, briefly consider current
trends to fashion non-traditional organs of justice as well as in-
creased roles for non-state actors in global environmental prob-
lem solving.
In distinguishing international environmental disputes, Ro-
mano's book at its outset develops the parameters of such dis-
putes. He argues that sifting such conflicts from the ocean of
international conflict is difficult because many, indeed nearly all,
conflicts between nations have their origins in environmental im-
pacts and resource allocation and access. Nonetheless, his study
considers clashes over impacts by nations and their nationals
which are caused by declining natural resources availability. In
fact, Romano draws no theoretical distinction in his considera-
tion of transboundary contamination and struggles to maximize
shares of natural resources. Romano demonstrates that resolu-
tion of either aspect of environmental conflict is resolved within
the context of existing modes of international dispute resolution,
which, in his view, remains the negotiated treaty model that
strives for a "win-win" outcome.
Indeed, Romano's book, an expansion of a remarkable disser-
tation, is most effective and useful in its detailing of the trends of
dispute settlement procedures in multilateral treaties. His analy-
sis exposes the complexity of these procedures while highlighting
common aspects that resonate in more than 270 environmental
treaties. Romano demonstrates that environmental conflicts are
resolved through a process that mimics the negotiation of trea-
ties-whatever the subject. The ultimate resolution resembles an
incident-specific solution-cum-treaty.
Romano maintains that negotiation of environmental treaties
replicates the process by which nearly all disputes between na-
tions are resolved (where there is no resort to the instruments of
coercion or the use of violence, viz, warfare). Romano's study is
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thus important for its development of how treaties assist nations
to take advantage of institutionalized procedural trends while
granting them some range of choice as to the actual process in-
voked. For example, recent multilateral treaties provide for com-
pulsory conciliation as a condition precedent to the use of more
formal processes, such as resort to the International Court of Jus-
tice ("ICJ"). Also, recent agreements have recognized the im-
portance of non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") and
third party intervention.
However, the emergence of non-compliance procedures has
been the most remarkable development in multilateral accords.
So while the nearly exponential increase of multi-nation accords
with respect to the environment has increasingly formalized dis-
pute resolution, such adjudicative processes are often by-passed
for non-compliance procedures. The emergence of non-compli-
ance procedures, since the "success" story of international ozone
protection, fuels Romano's pragmatism in his view of interna-
tional environmental/resource dispute resolution. In his view,
states rarely subordinate sovereignty and its cluster of "values"
to international adjudication of arbitration, preferring the non-
confrontational multilateral methodology of non-compliance
procedures. He also points out that the monumental, most in-
tractable, and finally most threatening environmental problems
such as global warming and ozone depletion do not fit the tradi-
tional state-to-state tort model of bilateral, transboundary con-
tamination. Rather, problems such as deforestation or even
species extinction are at least regional and, at worst, global. Vio-
lators in such instances are responsible to the collective global
community, not to sovereign rivals across an international
boundary line.
As the ozone protection regime illustrates, non-compliance re-
gimes depend on a network of accommodating international re-
gimes, buttressed by international law. Such regimes, such as
that established in Montreal, provide an evolving institution
which keeps pace with metamorphosis in the relevant science and
provides for expansion of the original terms of the original treaty
establishing a secretariat. Sovereignty is protected for each of
the nations that participate in the regime to a far greater extent
than the uncertainty intrinsic to third-party adjudication. Ro-
mano, in fact, concludes that non-compliance procedures have a
prophylactic function. They succeed precisely because nations
agree to their terms on an evolving and negotiated basis and do
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not commit them a fortiori to legal obligations that may prove, in
their view, to be ruinous.
Nonetheless, Romano contends that an additional advantage
of non-compliance has been some increased support for adjudi-
cation through what he terms a "mature" stance towards adjudi-
cation. The increasing pervasiveness of adjudication clauses in
multilateral treaties is evidence that states are, in many instances,
willing to accept third party determinations as a means of ulti-
mately resolving disputes. This willingness to accept a resolution
by a "neutral" decision-maker is, however, hedged by a lack of
compulsory jurisdiction for international adjudication. Thus,
states commonly make it clear that International Court of Justice
jurisdiction is subject to the capacity of states to withdraw from
its jurisdiction when disputes are submitted to it by opposing
sovereigns.
However, the "mature" stance towards legally-binding adjudi-
cation has not been evident when it comes to climate change.
Despite the U.S.'s absence at the July 2001 climate talks in Bonn,
Germany, Japan thwarted a legally-binding non-compliance pro-
cedure for the Kyoto Protocol.3 This current lack of legally-bind-
ing consequences for non-compliance results in nation's carbon
emission commitments from the already negotiated first phase of
reductions spilling over into the yet-negotiated second phase-
with 30% of the non-complying nation's original reduction com-
mitment added to the total carbon reduction requirement. 4 Be-
cause the parties to the Kyoto Protocol have not yet negotiated
the second phase of reductions, non-complying nations may rely
on the negotiation process rather than brave any legal conse-
quences.5 The evolving, negotiated nature of non-compliance
procedures, as described by Romano, trumps calls for compul-
sory international adjudication. Some agree with Romano that
in order for Kyoto to be successful, its non-compliance proce-
dures must remain flexible and evolving, like those of the Mon-
treal Protocol.6 The success of Kyoto's non-compliance
procedure appears to rest on the protection of sovereignty of
member states by permitting the system to evolve over time.
3. See Vanessa Houlder, Bonn Climate Talks Reach Agreement on Kyoto, FNAN-
CIAL TIMEs, July 22, 2001, at A19, available at www.ft.comlkyoto.
4. See R.J. Kopp, An Analysis of the Bonn Agreement, available at http://www.
weathervane.rff.org/features/featurel34.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2001).
5. See id.
6. See Edward A. Parson, Moving Beyond the Kyoto Impasse, N.Y. TIMES, July
31, 2001, at A23.
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Romano, not incidentally, discusses with great facility and
comprehension the role of the ICJ in international environmen-
tal disputes. However, he does not discuss other, sometimes
compulsory, adjudication contained in such multilateral agree-
ments as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
("UNCLOS"), the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), and re-
gional entities such as the European Union ("EU") and the
North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"). In the
end, Romano believes arbitration succeeds because on an ad hoc
basis states can determine the choice of law, rules of procedure,
and time frames of the process. One consequence of practical
significance is the expensive and time-consuming nature of the
process, given the threshold issues that must be resolved. Thus,
real obstacles to resolution remain even if substantive issues are
not yet reached for discussion. Arbitration's dynamic nature is
also its most significant disadvantage. An additional advantage
to the reader, however, is that Romano's expert comparison of
the provisions of the various treaties provides a subtle and com-
prehensive overview of the arbitration process.
As a prelude to the introduction of the many and highly reada-
ble ICJ case studies which make up much of the book, Romano
discusses the ICJ in sufficient detail for one to understand the
tribunal's intrinsic limits, and thus the modest outcomes of its de-
liberations. The Court decides cases only upon mutual confer-
ence of jurisdiction or if the given bi-lateral or multi-lateral
agreement stipulates that the ICJ shall serve as a forum. Op-
tional declarations of jurisdiction are sometimes a feature of
treaties.
Romano describes the recent development of the ICJ chamber
on Environmental Matters. The chamber's creation may reduce
the possibility of the ICJ losing some of its functions to other
international adjudicative bodies, such as the proposed Interna-
tional Environmental Court. Advocates of this new court are
driven by the interests of non-state entities, such as private liti-
gants (receptors of the effects of transboundary pollution unrep-
resented by their national governments) or NGOs, whose
environmental passion is sometimes stronger than their national
prejudices or even loyalties. Possibly, the activation of this body
will not only undermine the ICJ's proposed chamber, but will
also pose a threat to sovereignty-linked dispute resolution. And,
of course, the greater the threat to sovereignty, the less likely
there will be a resolution which will protect the environment
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more than the national interests of the states involved, narrowly
conceived.
Interestingly, individuals and NGOs attempted to bring claims
against France for its nuclear testing in the South Pacific in the
mid 1990s. Complaints were filed before the European Commis-
sion of Human Rights, the Human Rights Committee, and the
Court of Justice of the European Communities-all of which de-
termined that they had no jurisdiction. In this conflict in which
nuclear contamination posed the potential to radiate a significant
part of the planet's largest expanse of water, the organs of inter-
national justice were largely impotent.
Much of Romano's work is devoted to exceptionally well-done
case studies of celebrated international environmental disputes.
Commencing with the Bering Sea Fur Seals arbitration, the book
continues its surveys with other conflicts that turned on marine
biological resources: Icelandic Fisheries Jurisdiction, or the Ice-
landic/English Cod War, the Canadian-Spanish Turbot, and the
Southern Bluefin Tuna conflict. Three cases involve disputes
about international watercourses: Lake Lanoux, Diversion of
the Meuse river, and Gabcikovo-Nagymaros. Three classics of
transboundary pollution complete the case studies: Trail
Smelter, 1966-1972 French Nuclear Tests, Phosphates of Nauru.
Each study describes the settlement process employed, the legal
pleadings and awards granted. Of equal consequence, Romano
devotes attention to the environmental outcome and whether
the adjudication was protective or ameliorative.
Of Romano's case studies, the Turbot dispute between Canada
and Spain (represented by the EU) best exemplifies his thesis. In
1994-1995, the dispute flared up when Canada enforced its do-
mestic fisheries protection laws beyond its 200-mile exclusive ec-
onomic zone against Spanish trawlers. While proceedings before
the ICJ dragged on for three years after the conflict (ultimately
ending with the case being thrown out for lack of jurisdiction
which Canada refused to grant), the legal issues that were to be
argued were ultimately solved through negotiations and interna-
tional agreements within a few months. The EU and Canada
signed a bilateral agreement within six months of the conflict and
four months later the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea Re-
lating to the Conservation of Straddling Fish Stocks was adopted.
These agreements brought a solution to the dispute, supporting
Romano's thesis that international environmental disputes tend
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to be solved through negotiation between nations rather than in-
ternational adjudication.
Central to Romano's book is his belief that adjudication will
not solve the global environmental "problematique," to use
Guruswamy's phrase.7 He believes that international adjudica-
tion will always be enveloped by the wider political context in
which environmental problem solving must necessarily occur.
He does, however, concede the utility of the Court as a subtle
coercive force influencing states to solve environmental and re-
source access disputes through diplomacy rather than the time-
consuming and unpredictable process of ICJ decisions. Also, the
ICJ can be helpful in its articulation of manageable and bright-
line legal principles that may form the common law basis of sub-
sequent dispute resolution. Nonetheless, whatever the case for
the ICJ, Romano argues that its decisions have not been determi-
native in the solution of environmental problems, for no other
reason than the requirement that states relinquish sovereignty.
Arbitration/mediation in the end shapes the reality of environ-
mental conflict resolution. Its capacity to adapt to evolving sci-
entific discovery and the consequent flexibility this gives the
negotiating parties makes the process more realistic, and thus
more fruitful. Multilateral treaties, which include in sorne cases
non-compliance processes, will shift the "action" away from the
traditional modes of judicial decision.
Romano predicts, and indeed hopes for, an increased role for
private parties and NGOs as significant players on the interna-
tional scene, citing examples of international dispute resolution
entities that grant some access to non-state actors. However,
consistent perhaps with the pragmatism which he argues under-
lies his view, he leaves hopes unexplored. This path not taken is,
however, one which merits further consideration in this essay.
II.
CITIZEN LITIGANTS, NGOS AND INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES
Access to international dispute resolution bodies by non-state
actors concerning environmental protection has been limited at
best. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
("UNCLOS") is the first to accord status to NGOs in the dispute
7. L. GURusWAMY Er. AL, INTERNATIONAL ENViRONMENTAL LAW AND WoRLD
ORDER: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 228 (2d ed. 1999).
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resolution process. Most international environmental institu-
tions lack forums with jurisdiction to resolve international envi-
ronmental disputes between nations, more less provide a forum
for private actors. Some individuals and NGOs have gained a
measure of success in airing international environmental disputes
in domestic courts. Bringing international environmental cases
in international judicial bodies like the ICJ has thus far eluded
non-state litigants because jurisdiction is limited to state actors.8
Several regional bodies have provided some access for private
parties, but non-state party standing has yet to substantially take
root in the world of multilateral international environmental ju-
dicial regimes.9 At first glance, it would seem that a lack of pri-
vate party standing in international environmental dispute
resolution bodies conforms with traditional jurisdictional limits
between sovereign states. However, international bodies that do
grant standing to non-state parties now outnumber those with
limited state-to-state jurisdiction.10 However, these bodies gener-
ally do not have an environmental focus."
Non-state party access to international environmental dispute
resolution remains limited at best, despite the liberalization of
international trade. Even before the rise of the WTO and re-
gional international trade blocks like the EU and NAFTA, non-
state parties had access to international dispute resolution bodies
when the issues disputed concerned economic interests in trade,
investments, labor, etc. Thus, while the cries for the free will and
self-determination of sovereignty outweighed calls for a more or-
ganized international system, international institutions granting
private parties access to resolution of economic disputes thrived.
Despite minor participation by non-state individuals and NGOs
in global environmental and human rights disputes, the WTO
and regional organizations have thrust forward the trade liberali-
zation cause by granting increased participation for non-state ac-
tors in trade disputes.
However, international trade is inherently linked to the health
of the global environment and non-state actors are beginning to
8. See ELXUu LAUTERPAcHT, AsEcrs OF THE ADMINISTRA-TION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL JuSTICE 67-72 (1991).
9. See Convention on the Protection of the Environment, Feb. 19, 1974, Den.-
Fin.-Nor.-Swed., 13 I.L.M. 591-97, art. 3 (providing foreign pollution victims access
to the offending state's tribunal in these four countries).
10. See Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies:
The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 709 (1999).
11. See id.
2001/2002] TRANSBO UNDARY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 117
sneak their way before international trade dispute resolution
bodies. While the doors to ICJ remain closed to non-state actors,
private parties are beginning to gain a voice of their own in inter-
national environmental disputes through trade dispute resolution
bodies designed to further international trade. The following lim-
ited survey of several major international bodies that grant lim-
ited access to private parties uncovers the opportunities and
limitations that these bodies provide.
A. Existing International Forums for Non-State Actors: The
Inspection Panel
The World Bank Inspection Panel ("Inspection Panel") is one
of the only international dispute resolution bodies that is specifi-
cally designed as a forum for non-state actors to bring environ-
mental and human rights disputes. Created in 1993, the
Inspection Panel is the World Bank's most significant effort to
reach out to the non-state community of NGOs and individuals
to formally dispute the Bank's decision-making process. 12 The
specific purpose of the three-member Inspection Panel is to per-
mit private citizens who feel that projects sponsored by the Bank
adversely or potentially harm their rights and interests to register
complaints for review and inspection.13 To date, the Inspection
Panel has received complaints against twenty Bank-sponsored
projects.' 4
So far, results from the Inspection Panel's reviews have ranged
from Bank management's complete withdrawal of Bank support
of development projects to reassessment of Bank projects. These
remedies, however, are not usually a result of Inspection Panel
decrees. Instead they are generally the result of the indirect pres-
sure applied to Bank lenders when Bank projects' flaws are ex-
posed through review and inspection by the Panel.' 5 Still, review
is only limited to Bank projects that receive complaints from pri-
12. See Chi Carmony, Beyond the Proposals: Public Participation in International
Economic Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1321, 1327-29 (2000).
13. See id.
14. See id. (listing eighteen projects); see also World Bank Inspection Panel web-
site available at http://wblnOO18.worldbank.org/ipn/ipnweb.nsf (last visited Jan. 10,
2002) (listing two additional projects).
15. See Richard E. Bissell, Current Development: Recent Practice of the Inspection
Panel of the World Bank, 91 A.J.I.L. 741, 742 (1997) (finding indirect pressure from
the World Bank Inspection Panel potentially more effective than its formal
procedures).
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vate parties. Thus, the Inspection Panel's jurisdiction is limited
only to Bank projects.
The Inspection Panel's jurisdiction is limited to complaints
from a group of persons with common interests affected by a
Bank act or omission due to a violation of Bank policy.16 Also,
the request for review is only available after all of the avenues of
review through the Bank's management have been exhausted
and the loan has not yet closed or been ninety-five percent dis-
bursed.17 Third-party members of the global community, how-
ever, may submit supplemental briefs to the Inspection Panel for
consideration. These memoranda often provide important tech-
nical information from NGOs with members not directly im-
pacted by the project at issue.' 8
Even though the Inspection Panel is an international body that
allows private actors to raise environmental disputes, subject
matter before the Inspection Panel is limited to the activities of
the Bank. Even further, the Inspection Panel is limited in that it
may only review whether the Bank observes its own policies and
procedures. The policies and procedures may not be reviewed
themselves. 19 The Inspection Panel is a small, limited window for
non-state actors to access quasi-judicial processes and norms of
providing a forum to hear and investigate complaints. Its narrow
focus on administrative oversight does not permit it to come
close to addressing private party's international environmental
grievances beyond the scope of World Bank loans.
B. Non-State Actors on the High Seas
Unlike the terrestrial Inspection Panel, the International Tri-
bunal for the Law of the Sea ("ITLOS") is a more traditional
international tribunal. The tribunal is required to employ other
international treaties and customary law within its decision-mak-
ing, as well as the specific provisions of UNCLOS. While ITLOS
may hear any international dispute over a contract or the terms
and obligations of UNCLOS (including fifty-nine of its three
hundred and twenty provisions specifically dedicated to environ-
mental protection),20 the tribunal's jurisdiction is mostly limited
16. See Houlder, supra note 3, at 1322.
17. See id.
18. See Bissell, supra note 15, at 743.
19. See Houlder, supra note 3, at 1322.
20. Lakshman D. Guruswamy, Should UNCLOS or GATTWTO Decide Trade
and Environment Disputes, 7 MNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 287, 291 (1998).
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to disputes between states. However, ITLOS's Sea-Bed Disputes
Chamber is permitted to hear cases between states and non-state
actors.21
But ITLOS accessibility is deceptive. The Sea-Bed Disputes
Chamber is the organ of ITLOS with specific jurisdiction over all
disputes concerning the exploration and exploitation of the sea-
bed area.22 Private, non-state actors are permitted to be parties
in deep sea mining disputes before the chamber, but only for the
purpose of interpreting contractual obligations.2 Thus, corpora-
tions that make up the future sea-bed mining industry would be
the only non-state parties with access to the tribunal. No individ-
uals or NGOs would be permitted to raise environmental issues
before the tribunal because these cases would not have the appli-
cable contractual subject matter. Although the future private
sea-bed mining industry would have access to the tribunal in
these limited circumstances, to apply for permission to mine the
deep sea-bed under UNCLOS industry must be sponsored by
their own state government.24 Thus, state sponsorship is at least
initially required to gain access to ITLOS, even for private cor-
porations. Still, states yield a little sovereignty to the contractual
interests of the corporate mining industry, but the doors to
ITLOS's Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber remain closed to non-state
actors seeking environmental justice.
C. Access to the WTO Dispute Settlement Process
Private party access to information from behind the closed
doors of WTO dispute settlement panels has been scarce, and
private party access to the dispute settlement process is almost
non-existent.2 Under the WTO, Panels and the Appellate Body
may only consider trade complaints and third-party intervention
submitted by Member Governments. 26 The powers of the WTO's
21. See Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, United Nations, 21
I.L.M. 1261, part X, § 5, art. 187, available at www.un.orgIDepts/los/unclos/
closindx.htm (hereinafter UNCLOS).
22. See Peggy Rodgers Kalas and Alexia Herwig, Dispute Resolution Under the
Kyoto Protocol, 27 ECoLoGY L. Q. 53, 76 (2000).
23. See UNCLOS, part XI, § 5, annex VI.
24. Romano, supra note 10, at 745.
25. See Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Non-Governmental Parties in the World
Trade Organization: Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations in the World
Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 331, 333 (1996).
26. See Jacqueline Peel, Giving the Public a Voice in the Protection of the Global
Environment: Avenues for Participation by NGOs in Dispute Resolution at the Euro-
pean Court of Justice and World Trade Organization, 12 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &
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dispute settlement bodies are not trivial, with the strength to rule
that nations must abolish or amend domestic law deemed trade
restrictive or face trade sanctions. Thus, under the WTO, Mem-
ber States yield a great deal of sovereignty in the name of free
trade. The WTO's lack of transparency and disregard for non-
state actors is well noted, but despite private parties' lack of locus
standi, NGOs are beginning to pierce the WTO's fierce fagade.
In the famous dispute over a U.S. ban on shrimp imports from
countries that did not require sea turtle excluder devices on
shrimp nets, the V/TO Appellate Body overturned a lower panel
decision holding that the panel could not consider supplementary
environmental briefs submitted by NGOs. 27 While the Appellate
Body did not rule that the panel had a legal obligation to use the
NGO briefs, it held that panels have the discretion to accept un-
solicited non-state submissions.28
Thus, non-state actors may now submit briefs directly to the
panel and the panel must at least consider the briefs before they
can be dismissed.29 While supplemental briefs can be submitted
by NGOs on environmental issues, access is also available to any
private party, opening the possibility of corporate access to VTO
panels. Although the doors to bringing actions before the WTO's
dispute resolution panels remain tightly closed to non-state ac-
tors, private parties reached the first steps toward these doors
when they were permitted to provide technical and legal gui-
dance on environmental matters through supplemental briefs.
Under the V/TO, state sovereignty to make domestic trade
policy is easily surrendered in favor of the smooth flow of global
trade, while, at the polar opposite, sovereignty is closely guarded
by limited access to the WTO's dispute resolution system. Na-
tions were eager to discard sovereignty in the name of a liberal
global economy, so long as they could be sure environmental reg-
ulations would not get in the way. Thus, because the WTO deems
all other international environmental law irrelevant and limits
standing to Member States, even if private parties raise issues
based on international environmental treaties signed by every
POL'Y 47, 62 (2001); see also Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotations Fi-
nal Act (World Trade Organization Agreements), Annex 2: Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legale/finale.htm (last visited June 3, 2001).
27. Id. at 65; see also United States Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Product, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at 1998 WL 720123.
28. Id. at 66.
29. Id. at 68.
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WTO Member State, environmental issues raised by non-state
actors are excluded from WTO dispute resolution.
30
D. NAFTA's Private Party Access
While private actors have made scant progress in accessing the
WTO's state-to-state dispute resolution, NAFTA willingly pro-
vides non-state access to dispute resolution forums. 31 Under
NAFTA, non-state actors have standing to international dispute
resolution when the non-state actor is an investor from one of
the three NAFTA Member States and the non-state actor has
made or is seeking to make an investment in one of the other
NAFTA Member States.32 NAFTA's "side agreement," The
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
("NAEC"), also provides a forum for private parties to bring
complaints before a trilateral Commission for Environmental
Cooperation ("CEC").33
NAFTA's Chapter 11 provides for arbitration for investment
disputes through international systems that already exist: the
World Bank's International Center for the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes ("ICSID"); the ICSID's Additional Facility Rules;
or the rules of the United Nations Commission for International
Trade Law ("UNCITRAL rules"). 34 Although the arbitration
provided under Chapter 11 equalizes state and non-state actors
under international law, it is only available to non-state actors in
investment disputes.3 5 Thus, while private parties have access to
arbitration for investment disputes, dispute resolution is limited
for environmental disputes.36
Interestingly, because cross-border investment involves issues
that impact the environment like vehicles and transportation,
telecommunications, and agriculture, NAFTA indirectly grants
access for investors to these environmental issues.37 Here,
NAFTA grants standing under Chapter 11 for cross-border pri-
30. See GURUSWANY supra note 71, at 288.
31. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.LM. 605, ch. 11, § B, available at http:/www.nafta-sec-alena.org/english/index.htm
(last visited June 2, 2001) (hereinafter NAFTA).
32. Noemi Gal-Or, Private Party Direct Access: A Comparison of the NAFTA and
the EU Disciplines, 21 B. C. IN'L & COMp. L. REv. 1, 14 (1998).
33. See RALPH H. FoLsoM, NAFrA n. A NUTSHELL 208 (1999).
34. See NAFTA, ch. 11.
35. See Gal-Or, supra note 32, at 26.
36. Id. at 14.
37. Id. at 26.
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vate investors in investment disputes with Member States, not
other citizens who may have an even greater stake in these envi-
ronmental disputes.
However, NAFTA provides private party access to environ-
mental dispute resolution under the NAEC side agreement.
NAEC foremost requires member states to provide private par-
ties access to environmental remedies within each member state.
While the NAEC requires member states to enforce their own
environmental regulations and standards, indirect private access
to international environmental dispute resolution is available
through this side agreement. The NAEC's CEC Secretariat may
issue Article 13 reports on environmental matters to the CEC
Council of Ministers, made up of member-state cabinet offi-
cials.3 8 Unless rejected by a two-thirds majority of the Council of
Ministers, private parties may petition the Secretariat to issue
Article 13 reports.39 The information made available in these re-
ports has resulted in U.S. and Mexican government environmen-
tal clean-up and information exchange concerning air pollution
impact on migratory birds. 40 Thus, by petitioning the Secretariat
for Article 13 reports, private parties have a voice in rousing in-
vestigation and exposure of cross-border environmental
problems.
More directly, under Article 14, non-state parties may submit
complaints (called Submissions on Enforcement Matters
("SEM")) concerning workplaces, enterprises, or sectors that
produce goods or services addressed by NAFTAINAEC to the
Secretariat that allege a party is not enforcing its own environ-
mental laws.41 If the Secretariat finds that the SEM deserves a
response from the member state in question, the Secretariat may
then develop a factual report to the Council, upon two-thirds ap-
proval by the Council.42 The report is presented to the Council,
which, upon another two-thirds approval, may release the report
to the public.43 While public exposure is the only sanction availa-
38. See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14,
1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1480, art. 13, available at http://www.cic.org/
pubs info_resources/law_treat-agree/naaec05.cfm?varlan=english (last visited Aug.
12, 2001) [hereinafter NAAEC].
39. Id.
40. See supra note 24, at 210; see also NORTH AMERICAN COMISSION FOR ENVI-
RONMENTAL COOPERATION, SECRETARIAT REPORT ON THE DEATH OF MIGRATORY
BIRDs AT THE SILVA RESERVOIR (1994-95).
41. See NAAEC, art. 14.
42. See id.
43. See id.
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ble to private parties under Article 14, it has resulted in member-
states abandoning environmentally harmful decisions.44
Article 14 complaints must first clear many hurdles to be ac-
cepted by the Secretariat. First, all internal, domestic private
remedies must be exhausted within the national system before
the Secretariat will receive the complaint.45 Second, because
NAAEC excludes issues arising from occupational health and
safety and natural resource exploitation, the complaint must not
address claims over these issues.46 Third, alleged government in-
action must not be due to a reasonable exercise of official discre-
tion in investigation, prosecution, regulation, and compliance. 47
Fourth, Article 14 complaints must be aimed at promoting en-
forcement rather than "harassing industry. ' 48 Fifth, complaints
must be filed in a timely manner.49 Finally, while personal stand-
ing for the complaining party is usually found liberally, because
NAEC is focused on compliance with existing domestic law, com-
plaints can be raised against legislative action.50 Once a com-
plaint clears each of these standing hurdles it may be filed. Thus,
despite the access provided to non-state actors under Article 14
of NAEC, the submission must still weave through a maze of
44. See, e.g., Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters, Comit6 Para la Pro-
tecci6n de los Recursos Naturales, et al., Mex., SEM-96-001, Jan. 17, 1996, available
at http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides-registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&
submission.
45. See Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters, The Friends of Old Man
River, Can., SEM-96-003, Secretariat's Determination, art. 15(1), Nov. 8, 1996, avail-
able at http:/lwww.cec.orglcitizenlguidesjregistray/registryview.cfm?&varlan=en-
glish&submission; Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters, Aage Tottrup,
Can., SEM 96-002, Secretariat's Determination, art. 14(2), May 28, 1996, available at
http://www.cec.orglcitizenlguides-registray/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&
submission.
46. See, e.g., Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters, Canadian Environ-
mental Defense Fund, Can., SEM-98-002, Secretariat's Determination, art. 14 (1),
Aug. 25, 1997, available at http://www.cec.orglcitizenlguides-registray/registryview.
cfm?&varlan=english&submission.
47. See NAAEC, art. 14
48. See id.
49. See, e.g., Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters, Hector Gregorio Ortiz
Martinez, Mex., SEM-97-004, Oct. 14, 1997, available at http://www.cee.orglcitizen/
guidesjregistray/registryview.cfn?&varlan=english&submission.
50. See, e.g., Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters, Sierra Club et al.,
U.S., SEM-95-001, Secretariat's Determination, arts. 14(1), 14(2), Dec. 8, 1995, avail-
able at http:llwww.cec.orglcitizenlguides-registray/registryview.cfm?&varlan=en-
glish&submission; Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters, Biodiversity Legal
Foundation et al., U.S., SEM 95-002, Secretariat's Determination, art. 14(2), Sept.
21, 1995, available at http:l/www.cec.orglcitizenlguides-registray/registryview.cfn?&
varlan=english&submission.
124 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 20:109
standing requirements. Still, NAFTA's NAEC provides an inter-
national forum for private parties to bring environmental
disputes.
E. Access for Investors: The ICSID
Although the ICSID has served as a forum for NAFTA invest-
ment disputes since 1994, it has served as a forum for interna-
tional investment arbitration since 1966.5 1 The ICSID provides a
neutral setting for arbitration between nations and foreign inves-
tors when their initial investment agreement expressly provides
for ICSID arbitration.5 2 Therefore, nations are not bound by the
ICSID unless they opt to include ICSID arbitration in their
agreements with private investors.5 3 Because it is a nation's pre-
rogative to subject itself to ICSID arbitration, private investors
may only seek arbitration with a nation if the nation agrees to be
subject to the ICSID.5 4 However, less developed states continu-
ally yield their own sovereignty to ICSID arbitration to attract
international commerce. 5
5
While private parties have access to the ICSID through agree-
ments with host states, the access is only available for investors.
Therefore, NGOs and concerned global citizens would usually be
unable to utilize the ICSID for arbitrating environmental dis-
putes with nations, even if the nation agreed. Perhaps more im-
portantly, NGOs and other concerned citizens are unable to
participate as affected parties in ICSID proceedings because they
are generally not included in investor-nation agreements.5 6 This
is significant in the context of the ICSID because of the more
than fifty cases registered since 1966, more than forty have sub-
stantial environmental impact, including: energy projects (oil,
gas, hydroelectric), hotel & resort construction, manufacturing
(including a chemical plant project, and several waste disposal
51. See International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes web site
at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/about/about.htm (last visited June 2, 2001).
52. See id.
53. See Glen T. Schleyer, Power to the People: Allowing Private Parties to Raise
Claims Before the WTO Dispute Resolution System, 65 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2275,
2305-06 (1997).
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See Christopher M. Koa, The International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment and Dispute Resolution: Conciliating and Arbitrating with China through
the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 24 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. 7
POL. 439, 448-50 (1991).
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projects), mining, forestry exploitation, and road building.57 Al-
most always between a multinational corporation and a develop-
ing nation, most of these investment disputes have substantial
environmental impacts due to the nature of the investment
projects. Despite the huge environmental consequences of IC-
SID arbitrations, non-state actors that are not investors are not
permitted a voice in ICSID arbitration. Again, under the ICSID,
states cede sovereignty for the benefits of international trade and
investment, disregarding other possible non-state actors with en-
vironmental concerns.
F. Access through the ILO
The International Labor Organization ("ILO"), an agency of
the UN, is perhaps the most open international forum for non-
state actors to bring complaints against nations.58 Under Articles
24 and 25 of the ILO Constitution, workers' organizations can
raise "representations of non-observance" against Member
States that they allege are not in compliance with ILO princi-
ples.59 These representations brought by NGOs spark investiga-
tions by the ILO Governing Body that may lead to public
exposure through a public report. More interestingly, the report
may lead to an official state complaint under Article 26 of the
ILO Constitution, which ultimately may result in the case being
heard by the ICI (upon agreement by the accused state).60 Bring-
ing environmental claims before the ILO is possible, as long as
the claims are based on ILO conventions.61
While the ILO's power has less bite than the WTO, its adjudi-
cation process is significantly more open to non-state actors than
most other international organizations.62 While the ILO's power
is limited to public embarrassment, and diplomatic scolding, it
provides NGOs with a voice. However, the ILO's limited power
is mainly due to states clinging to their sovereign rights to dictate
57. Id.; see also International Center, supra note 37.
58. See Schleyer, supra note 53 at 2306-07.
59. David A. Wirth, Reexamining Decision Making processes in International En-
vironmental Law, 79 IowA L. REv. 769, 782 (1994); see also INrmRNATIoNAL LA-
BOUR ORGAMNZATION CONsr., art. 24, 25, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/
englishlaboutliloconst.htm (last visited June 11, 2001).
60. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION CONST., art. 26 at http://www.
ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/enforced/index.htm> (last visited June 11,
2001).
61. See generally id., at art. 10.
62. See Kal Raustiala, The "Participatory Revolution" in International Environ-
mental Law, 21 HARv. ENvrI. L. RFv. 537, 555 (1997).
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their own labor laws and practices. Despite the ILO's obvious
weaknesses, it could be a valuable resource for non-state actors
to bring environmental complaints.
G. The European Court of Justice
As a regional tribunal, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ")
permits significantly more non-state actor participation in actions
against environmental polluters than its global counterparts.63 As
with other international tribunals, individuals and NGOs may
lobby Member States to bring actions on environmental issues
before the ECJ, and, where permitted by domestic rules, non-
state actors can bring actions in Member's domestic courts based
on EU environmental law. 4 NGOs may also use the ECJ's "pre-
liminary reference" procedure to obtain ECJ judgments on EU
environmental law issues raised in Member State courts.65 How-
ever, much like standing requirements in the United States,
NGOs and individuals may only bring actions that are of "direct
and individual concern" to the NGO or individual.66
Meeting ECJ standing requirements can sometimes be diffi-
cult. Several cases before the Court have tested the extent of the
direct individual concern requirements. 67 In an attempt to stretch
the standing rules so they reflect the broad, shared environmen-
tal interests of the global community, Greenpeace International
attempted to challenge the European Commission's disburse-
ment of funds to Spain for the construction of two power-plants
in the Canary Islands.68 The Court rejected Greenpeace's stand-
ing to challenge EU actions in the ECJ, preferring to give defer-
ence to Member's national courts.69 However, the ECJ's standing
requirements may soon be relaxed because the EU and all of its
63. See Philippe Sands, European Community Environmental Law: The Evolution
of a Regional Regime of International Environmental Protection, 100 YALE L.J. 2511,
2518 (1991).
64. See id.
65. Jacqueline Peel, Giving the Public a Voice in the Protection of the Global Envi-
ronment: Avenues for Participation by NGOs in Dispute Resolution at the European
Court of Justice and World Trade Organization, 12 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 47, 50 (2001).
66. See id.; see also Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11, art. 230 (formerly art. 173), available at http://www.europa.eu.int/
eur-lexlen/treaties/index.html (last visited May 27, 2001).
67. See Peel, supra note 26, at 50-55.
68. See Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) v. The Commi-
sion of European Communities, 1998 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 9723; 1998 ECR 1-1651.
69. See id.
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Member States signed on to the 1998 Convention on Access to
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making, and Ac-
cess to Justice in Environmental Matters, granting NGOs wider
access to justice on environmental matters.70 While the Court
refuses to grant standing based on common, shared environmen-
tal interests and interconnected ecosystems, it is eager to uphold
traditional notions of law based on property and contracts. Thus,
international corporations seeking dispute resolution may easily
bring cases before the ECJ and environmental NGOs must
weave their way through a maze of standing requirements for
relief.
While the desire to compartmentalize international issues into
categories like "security," "economics and trade," "human
rights," and "environment" may be hard to resist, the once solid
lines between these subjects blur as the world becomes intercon-
nected. Trade organizations particularly seem to begin their exis-
tence by attempting to remain purely focused on trade, without
mixing in the impurities of issues like environmental health.
However, as with the European Union (and the United States of
America), trade organizations require oversight of more than
just trade because they are too interconnected with these other
aspects of global society.
III.
EMERGING PARADIGMS OF CITIZEN ACCESS IN
INTERNATIONAL ENVIROMENTAL CONFLICTS
In an attempt to clear the sovereignty hurdle that Romano
skillfully highlights in his book, some researchers call for an in-
ternational procedural system granting reciprocal access to do-
mestic courts.71 Though private party access to international
dispute resolution bodies remains limited in scope in all but a few
exceptions, equal access to foreign domestic courts is a possible
alternative to over-arching international regimes with dispute
resolution mechanisms. International agreements that grant non-
state actors an equal right of access to administrative and judicial
70. See Peel, supra note 26, at 54-62; see also Convention on Access to Informa-
tion, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmen-
tal Matters, June 25, 1998, available at http://www.unece.orglenv/pp/treatytext.htm.
71. See ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, REPORT FROM THE SIXM MEET_
ING OF EXPERTS FOR THE SIXTH INTER-AMERICAN SPECIALIZED CONFERENCE ON
PRIVATE INTERNAiIONqAL LAW (CIDIP-VI), Topic III: PART 2: CIVIL INTERNA-
TIONAL LABiLrrY FOR CORSSBOUNDARY POLLUTION, (Dec. 3-4, 1998) (on file with
author).
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procedures in the state where environmental harm originates
provide the same redress available to the citizenry in which the
harm originates.
The European Court of Justice provides parties within the EU
access to an international tribunal for international environmen-
tal wrongs. However, in most of the EU, private party equal ac-
cess by foreigners to domestic courts is still largely non-
existent.72 The Nordic Convention on the Protection of the Envi-
ronment remains the exception to this rule, granting non-state
actors from Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden standing to
sue in the domestic courts of the other parties to the treaty.
When the Nordic Convention was signed in 1974, it was truly a
bold endeavor. Its diminutive length is no accident. While the
four constituents crafted the treaty for the protection of the
Scandinavian environment, the treaty has no specific technical
standards or substantive environmental protections. Instead, it is
completely process-oriented. 73 The Convention relaxes standing
requirements, permitting receptors of foreign pollution equal ac-
cess to the same remedies as citizens of the offending state.74 The
Convention specifically ensures that the private party raising the
complaint is treated the same throughout the legal system of the
nation in which the harm originates. 75 This also opens the legal
systems of the four member-states to the full appellate process.76
Many have argued for a similar reform of standing throughout
Europe and the rest of the world.77 In Africa, for example, the
Bamako Convention on the Ban of Import Into Africa and the
Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Haz-
ardous Wastes Within Africa calls for a protocol to be drafted by
experts on a liability scheme-which may include a reciprocal
system similar to the Nordic Convention.78 Such a cross-bound-
ary liability regime with open access to non-state actors would
72. See EUROPEAN UNION PREPARATORY Ac=s, WHrrE PAPER ON ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LIABILrrY, (Feb. 9,2000), EU: COM 2000/0066, Celex NO. 500DC0066 [herein-
after White Paper].
73. See Sean D. Murphy, Prospective Liability Regimes for the Transboundry
Movement of Hazardous Wastes, 88 A.J.I.L. 24, 47 (1994).
74. See Nordic Convention, art. 3.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See Ann M. Lininger, Liberalizing Standing for Environmental Plantiffs in the
European Union. 4 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L. J. 90 (1995).
78. Bamako Convention on the Ban of Import Into Africa and the Control of
Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa,
Jan. 29, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 773, art. 12.
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provide an international system that grants possible remedies to
victims of international environmental harm, while maintaining
state sovereignty.79 States would retain the ability to legislate
and interpret their own laws, but would permit non-nationals
equal access to their courts. In this respect, the Nordic Conven-
tion moots traditional concerns that states will lose their sover-
eignty to international organizations.
The open access to national courts established by the Nordic
Convention may provide non-state actors redress to international
environmental wrongs. However, its system of reciprocal jurisdic-
tion is by definition limited to the four signatories to the treaty.
Thus, the citizens of the member-states have no standing by vir-
tue of the treaty to redress for environmental harms originated in
states not parties to the Nordic Treaty.
A more fundamental systemic problem lies at the heart of the
Nordic treaty. Foreign plaintiffs may only receive the environ-
mental protection the offending state provides to its own citi-
zens.80 Thus, foreign plaintiffs may have no remedy if the state
that is the source of the environmental harm provides no protec-
tion to its own nationals through its laws. While this is probably
not a major issue for the four signatories to the treaty because
their economies and legal systems are similar and they share
many cultural/environmental values, a treaty expanded beyond
such a kindred group of nations would surely need to account for
major inconsistencies and lacunae in the environmental laws of
nation states.
The Nordic treaty and other agreements to regionalize judicial
access is an important step in expanding remedies for interna-
tional environmental wrongs. As the European Community
White Paper on Environmental Liability suggests:
Environmental liability aims at making the causer of environmen-
tal damage (the polluter) pay for remedying the damage that he
has caused. Environmental regulation lays down norms and proce-
dures aimed at preserving the environment. Without liability, fail-
ure to comply with existing norms and procedures may merely
result in administrative or penal sanctions. However, if liability is
added to regulation, potential polluters also face the prospect of
79. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, supra note 66, at 132.
80. David Scott Rubinton, Toward a Recognition of the Rights of Non-States in
International Environmental Law. 9 PAcE E vmr. L. REv. 475, 490 (1992).
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having to pay for restoration or compensation of the damage they
caused.81
Environmental liability is a way of implementing the main princi-
ples of environmental policy enshrined in the EC Treaty (Article
174 (2)), above all the polluter pays the principle. If this principle is
not applied to covering the costs of restoration of environmental
damage, either the environment remains unrestored or the State,
and ultimately the taxpayer, has to pay for it. Therefore, a first
objective is making the polluter liable for the damage he has
caused. If polluters need to pay for damage caused, they will cut
back pollution to the point where the marginal cost of abatement
exceeds the compensation avoided. Thus, environmental liability
results in prevention of damage and in internalization of environ-
mental costs. Liability may also lead to the application of more
precaution, resulting in avoidance of risk and damage, as well as it
may encourage investment in R & D for improving knowledge and
technologies.
Internalization of environmental costs means that the costs of
preventing and restoring environmental pollution will be paid di-
rectly by the parties responsible for the damage rather than being
financed by society in general. 82
The White Paper thus suggests a Nordic regime for the entire
European Union and provides a coherent rationalization for
non-state enforcement of environmental norms. Where nations
may fear to tread for reasons of state sovereignty, individual
plaintiffs are less likely to weigh foreign policy considerations in
their quest for compensation for damages personally served.
And despite the White Paper's reservation about expanding
concepts of individual liability for environmental pollution "to
pollution of a widespread, diffuse character, where it is impossi-
ble to link the negative environmental effects with the activities
of individual actors," 83 environmental advocacy groups are dis-
cussing lawsuits designed to impose financial responsibility for
acts which contribute to global warming.
The White Paper argues that its liability concept is not suitable
for dealing with the "effects of climate change brought about by
C02 and other emissions [or] forests dying as a result of acid
rain, '84 environmental lawyers representing groups like Green-
peace, the World Wildlife Fund and the Natural Resources De-
81. See White Paper, supra note 72, § 2.1
82. Id. § 3.1.
83. Id. § 2.2.
84. Id.
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fense Council recently met to consider filing lawsuits against
corporations whose plants emit greenhouse gases and thus con-
tribute to global climate change.85
In the environmental summit meeting, the lawyers for the ad-
vocacy groups did not decide whether legal action should be
taken in U.S. courts or international tribunals. But plaintiffs
would be people, or even nations such as the island states who
are threatened with submersion if ocean levels continue to rise.
In additon to the corporations, defendants could be federal agen-
cies such as the Environmental Protection Agency which fails to
regulate adequately the generation of pollutants, or the Energy
Department which subsidizes the use of fossil fuels.
Though environmental scholars were generally skeptical, re-
flecting many of the reservations of the EU White Paper (a law-
yer for the conservative Pacific Legal Foundation called the
approach "nuts"),8 6 legal scholars such as Professor Andrew
Strauss have argued that globalization has shifted dispute settle-
ment from diplomatic links forged by nations to private dispute
resolution.87 Another commentator who was skeptical about the
success of liability regimes for global environmental harms con-
ceded that, "[i]n some circumstances, legal actions are evaluated
or pursued not with expectations of success in court, but recog-
nizing that a real victory would be in the court of public
opinion." 88
Obviously non-state actor lawsuits for compensation for the
consequences of global environmental pollution are in a nascent,
if not embryonic stage. But the imaginative strategies of environ-
mental advocacy groups suggest that non-state actors are increas-
ingly important players in the protection of the international
environment. At more than a conceptual level, personal liability
for harms to the global commons as well as transboundary pollu-
tion has emerged out of nation-state deadlock as a potentially
effective strategy to protect the environment and to abate
pollution.
85. See Kathryn Q. Seelye, Global Warming May Bring New Variety of Class Ac-
tion, N.Y. TMsnS, Sept. 6, 2001, at A16.
86. See iL
87. Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assem-
bly: Legiticmacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L., 191
(2000).
88. See Seelye, supra, note 81.
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To be sure, private access to international environmental jus-
tice, either in national courts or in international tribunals, col-
lides with the nearly sacrosanct principle of sovereignty (a
ground norm for developed as well as developing nations). Ro-
mano's legal realistic perspective on sovereignty concedes it as an
obstacle to the adjudication of environmental disputes in the in-
ternational law/state-to-state sphere. Indeed, he argues that al-
lowing non-state actors access to the ICJ would contradict the
very nature of the Court which is "to serve the needs of peace
and justice" of the community of sovereign states.8 9 Elsewhere,
however, he suggests that ICJ standing should be extended to
specialized international organizations to avoid disturbing the
"nature" of the Court. 90 Though arguing for institutional coher-
ence of the ICJ, he recognizes the logic of non-state intervention
in some disputes ostensibly between nations.91 Finally, he also
accepts a role for non-state actors, even where the legal action
before the ICJ concerns antagonistic states, arguing that the ICJ
ought to accept NGO petitions for advisory opinions.92
Romano's suggestions may not satisfy the desires of non-state
actors to gain access to foreign courts and international tribunals
like the ICJ, but they are consistent with his realist view that in-
ternational environmental law must be approached by conceding
the persistent view of sovereignty's saliency. Within this context,
non-state actors should continue to force open the doors of inter-
national dispute resolution bodies by both frontal assaults and by
end-runs around the borders of sovereignty.
89. See Romano, supra note 10, at 335.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 336.
